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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BANK
, ,:ocpordt ion,

&

TRUST,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

SECURITY MORTGAGE, INC.,
corporation, F. A. BADGER,
i'.DRIENNE BADGER, JOHN N. BUSK,
?A'!'RiCIA C. BUSK, H. MERVIN
'1iALLACE, VIRGINIA S. WALLACE,
M. WALLACE AND CAROLYN
M. WALLACE,

Supreme Court No. 19086

JTAH

3

Defendants-Appellants.

Plaintiff and respondent Continental Bank and Trust Company
'hereinafter the "Respondent") by and through its attorneys Fabian
submit the following brief in response to the brief on
of defendants and appellants.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent seeks to enforce the liability of individual
1efendants and appellants John N. Busk, Patricia C. Busk, H. Mervin
Virginia

s.

Wallace, Robert M. Wallace and Carolyn M.

·ioclace (hereinafter the "Appellants") as guarantors for three

=- )m1ssory '.'\Otes.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
On December 13, 1982, Judge Fishler of the Third District
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granted Respondent's
-1-

&

motion for

summary judgment in "n action ari::;ing out of a defa",

three promissory notes.
22,

1983,

A judgment was later <>ntered on FPbru,,,

finding Appellants liable in the amount of

plus interest and attor'."leys'

fees.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants'

statement of facts contains several importan•

omissions and misstatements 11hich must be addressed in ord<>r to
assure a proper understanding of the issues involved.
recitation of the facts

is

Thus,

in order.

Respondent commenced this action in the court below to
recover the unpaid balances on three f?romissory notes that totct!':
$87, 745. 42 that were executed by F. Alonzo Badger on behalf of IJt''
Security Mortgage,

Inc., of which he was the President.

The unpa.·

notes covered three separate loans made to Utah Security
Inc.

(R.

76-79).

In making these loans to Utah Security Mortgaa'

Inc., Respondent r1>lied upon a Corporate Resolution Authorizing
Borrowings that was executed on June 28, 1977, authorizing Mr.
Badger to borrow money on behalf of Utah Security Mortgage, Inc.
(R.

205-06)

.l/

l/ The Corporate Resolution Authorizing Borrowings wa3'
standard form that Respondent required all corporations to PXeCJ'°
before they are lent money; it was signed by Dee F. Murphy, the
President of Utah Security Mortgage, Tnc. and provided that at a
Bodrd of Directors meeting held on June 28, 1977 a
•0 •
adopted authorizing the following:
[T]hat [Utah Security Mortgage, Inc.] borrow money from
time from [Continental Ban'<] in such amounts as may be deem<:
necessary for the use of [Utah Security Mortgage, Inc.] by_'-·
officers herein authorized and empower1>d to execute and de.t the obligation or
of [Utah Security Mortgage,
(Footnote continued on next page)

-2-

The unpaid notes were executed by Utah Security Mortgage,
,s part of an arrangement with Respondent for warehousing
u.1'11llents of trust deeds as security for a line of credit -- a
03 ::1ce that

is common in the banking industry.

(R.

338-39,

Under this arrangement Respondent made loans to Utah
i•c1r ity Mortgage, Inc. in order to finance mortgage loans that Utah
security Mortgage, Inc. had made to certain borrowers for the
:.:chase of real property.

The mortgage loans made by Utah Security

,·lort'jdge, I!'lc. were secured by trust deeds from the borrowers.
3;3-398,
·:tah

464).

(R.

The trust deeds were then assigned to Respondent by

Security Mortgage, I!'lc. as collateral until Utah Security

.·ior tgage, Inc. sold the trust deeds in the secondary market to
the Utah Housing Finance Agency, the Federal National
Association, or other entities in the business of
:,rchdsing trust deeds.

When a trust deed was sold in the secondary

Mrket, Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. would use the money to repay
. :s loans from Respondent.

(R.

345-46, 349, 358) .

Respondent did not perfect its security interest in the
0

:s1g:;me!1ts of the trust deeds, because to do so would have

:estricted the subsequent sale of the trust deeds in the secondary

oot:;ote continued from previous page)
and that F. Alonzo Badger, President [is] hereby authorized and
•mpowered to execute and deliver in the name of [Utah Security
'tor tgage, Inc.], and under or without its corporate sela, its
promissory note or notes therefor to [Respondent] for all such
sums so borrowed.
duS-06).
A similar Corporate Resolution Authorizing Borrowings
•xecuted on behalf of Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. on February
ll78, by i:s president, F. Alonzo Badger.
(R. 207-08).

-3-

market.l/

(R.

security for

142,

166-70).

the notes,

In order to obtain add1tiondl

credit to Utah Security Mortgage,

Inc.,

Respondent requirerl

Appellants to execute guaranties on June 29,
and May 5,

1978.

(R.

:t,

and as a condition for extending th,,

1977, February 2,

174-76).

The guaranty of May 5, 1978 is the one relied upon by
Respondent

in bringing this action.

to Utah Security Mortgage,

Inc.

It covered all debts

by Respondent up to $350,000,

contained the following provision:
[Respondent] shall not be required to proceed first
[Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. ] or any other person, firm or
corporation or against any collateral security held by it :ief
resorting to the Guarantor [s] for payment; and the liabilit'1:
the Guarantor [s] shall not be affected, released or exonerat2:
by release or surrender of any security held for the oayment:
any of the debts hereinabove mentioned.
(Emphasis supplied,,
(R.

176).
In accordance with the warehousing arrangement between'.·

Security Mortgage,

I'1c.

and Responde'1t,

the three unpaid promissc'

notes were secured by the assignments of four

trust deeds.

Thes'

trust deeds were sold in the secondary market to the Utah Housi,,:
Findnce Agency in August of 1979.

The proceeds of the sale, whic

under the warehousing arrangement were to go from the buyer to
Respondent,
Inc.

instead went from the buyer to Utdh Security Mortgaa'

The proceeds were never paid over to Respondent by Utah

ll For example, the Utah Housing Finance Agency, to
which Utah Security Mortgage, Inc. sold many of its trust deeds,
issued regulations that prohibit the agency's purchase of any tr.
deeds which are subject to an existing assignment.
(R. 142,
167-173).
-4-

_ ,,, :tf ;1ortgage,

Inc. despite the repeated requests for payment

made to Mr.
It was later

Badger.

learned that these proceeds were embezzled by

B•dqer who used them to invest in Bonneville Thrift and Loan
("Bonneville Thrift").

(R.

479-81).

cost:ion with Utah Security Mortgage,
oces1dent of Bonneville Thrift.

In addition to his

Inc., Mr. Badger was the

Appellants H. Mer'Jin Wallace and

'0h2ct M. Wallace were at that time directors of both Bonneville

"1r1ft dnd Utah Security Mortgage,

Inc.

Bonneville Thrift had been

·ottfted by the Commissioner of Financial Institutions (the
":'omm1ssioner")

that its capital was impaired, and that it would not

_ oermitted to

its operations unless it received $100,000

'c ddditional capital.
When Respondent learned of the embezzlement,

its Vice

'c;>sident and loan officer, Lohr S. Livingston, arranged a meeting
<.t'.l

Mr. Badgec and H. Mervin Wallace to discuss the three unpaid
The meeting too« place on or about November 30, 1979 in

JPS?Ondent' s main office.

(R.

479).

At the meeting, Mr. Badger

18.111tted he had wrongfully taken the money that was supposed to be
'"'d to Respondent.

Mr. Wallace offered to pledge 52,170 shares of

,1:·1c< in Bonneville Thrift as security on the notes.

dccepted oy Respondent.

(R.

The offer was

479-80).

On May 23, 1980, the Commissioner took possession of
:lie Thrift.

Six days later, on May 29, 1980, James R. Brown,

for Appellants, sent a letter to Glen E. Clark,

then counsel

requesting that Respondent sell the shares of
•ville Thrift stock that it held, with the proceeds from the

-5-

sale to be applied towards the unpaid Qalances on the
notes.

(R.

80).

Since receiving Mr.

Brown's letter,

at a.ll times been willing to sell the stock, but it has
contacted by anyone interested in purchasing any of the stock.
Beca.use the Commissioner had taken possession of Bonneville ThrJfany purchase of

its stock or assets would have to be negotiated

with, and approved by,

the Commissioner.1 1

Respondent is still holding 52,170 shares of Bonneville
Thrift stock that are worthless.
executed by F.
unpaid.

A.

The three promissory notes

Badger for Utah Security M'ortgage,

Inc.

Relying upon the continuing guaranty signed by all of t:1e

individual defendants on May 5, 1978, Respondent brought an actw
in the Third District Court, State of Utah, against Appellants to
recover the unpaid balances on the notes.

On December 13, 1982,

Judge Fishler granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment.

1/ After the Commissioner took over Bonneville Thrift 0 ".
May 23, 1980, Citizens Bankshares was then required to deal direc'
with the Commissioner in purchasing any assets of Bonneville
Thrift.
On July 8, 1980, Michael R. Carlston, counsel for Citiz-Bankshares, submitted a written proposal on its behalf to the
Commissioner proposing the purchase of certain assets of Bonne111c.Thr ift.
(R. 84-86).
An agreement between Citizens Bankshares a
the Commissioner was signed on August 18, 1980 in which Citizens
Bankshares acquired some of the assets of Bonneville Thrift.
(R. 87-90).
At no time, however, did Citizens Bankshares evPr rn'
an offer to purchase any of the stock in Bonneville Thrift,
including the stock pledged to Respondent.
(R. 99-100).

-6-

ARGUMENT
•PPELLANTS WAIVED THEIR RIGHTS TO THE COLLATERAL UNDER THE
;c;.,PRESS TERMS OF THE GUARANTY AGREEMENT.
Appellants cite several cases -- including Shaffer v.
445 P.2d 13, 5 UCC Rep. 772 (Wyo. 1968) -- for the
,10pns1tion that Appellants have been discharged from their
·01trdctJal obligations under the guaranty agreement by virtue of
'"spond?nt's alleged failure to prevent impairment of both types of
:ctlateral -- the assignments of trust deeds and the Bonneville
stock.

In so arguing, Appellants overlook the fact deemed

;ec1s1ve by the court below in granting Respondent's motion for
;cmmary judgment -- that by the express terms of the guaranty
Appellants consented to any such impairment of the
:·Ji lateral.

Section 3-606(1) (b) of the Uniform Commercial Code, Utah
:Jde Annotated

§

70A-3-606, provides:

The holder discharges any party to the instrument to the extend
that without such oarty's consent the holder . . . unjustifiably
1mpa1rs any collateral for the instrument given by or on behalf
of the party or any person against whom he has a right of
recourse.
(Emphasis supplied).
fhe statute, by expressly conditioning discharge by impairment of
on the lack of consent of the party seeking discharge,
cia11ly contemplates that a party may waive his impairment defense.
'ts principle is underscored by Comment 2 to § 3-606, which
'?rnplates that such a waiver may be granted by contract:
:onsent may be given in advance, and is commonly incorporated in
the instrument; or it may be given afterward.
It requires no
ons1deration and operates as a waiver of the consenting party's
.13nt to claim his own discharge.
(Emphasis supplied).
Wn1te and summers, Uniform Commercial Code, 2nd ed. at p. 527.
-7-

The guaranty agreement between Respondent and Appellant,
contains the type of consent envisioned by the draftsmen of
Uniform Commercial Code.

The agreement provides:

.. the said Bank shall not be required to proceed first
against the Debtor or any other person, firm or corporation 0
against any collateral security held by it before resorting
the Guarantor for payment; and the liability of the Guarantoc
shall not be affected, released or exonerated by release or
s ur: render of any secu r: i ty held for the payment of any of the
debts hereinbefore mentioned, nor by the release of any other
guarantor or surety.

t;

(R.

176).

By agreeing to be liable as guarantors notwithstanding

any "release or surrender" of the collateral, Appellants waived ac.
rights to claim discharge by virtue of impairment of the collateu
whether by Respondent's alleged failure to perfect a security
interest in the trust deeds, or by Respondent's allegedly negligee
failure to sell the shares of Bonneville Thrift.
A.

The Guaranty Agreement Expressly Provided that Respondent
had No Duty to Perfect a Security Interest in the Trust
Appellants, by waiving their rights to discharge resultc·

from a "release or surrender" of the collateral,

relieved Respond;·

of any duty it would otherwise have had to protect the trust deed;
by perfecting a security interest in them.

Several cases have he.

that identical or similar language in loan agreements prevented
borrowers or sureties from claiming discharge due to failure on··
part of the lender to perfect a security interest.
The leading case on this point is Etelson v. Suburban L

££.:_, 283 A. 2d 408, 9 UCC Rep. 1371 (Md. 1971).

In Ete ls on, the

secured party's failure to file a security interest in the
collateral caused the secured party to lose all rights in the
- 8-

. literal when its owner was declared bankrupt.

283 A.2d at 409.

c,H,oties, citing some of the same cases cited by Appellants
claimed that the secured creditor's failure to perfect was
i0

Jnjustified impairment of the collateral under

§

3-606(1) (b) of

uniform Commercial Code, which discharged their liability as
on the underlying promissory note.

The court rejected this

dcjurnent, because the borrowers, by consenting under provisions of
:ne note to the "release or exchange of any collateral without
1otice" waived any claim they might have had to discharge through
J1JJStified impairment.

The court held that failure to perfect a

security interest was a type of "release" of the collateral:
It is clear from the express wording of the endorsement that the
[secured creditor] could have released the collateral at any
time to the Etelsons and without the release affecting the
Etelsons' obligation to pay.
It would be illogical to rule that
the [secured creditor] had a duty to file the financing
statement and its failure to do so released the endorsers, when
under the endorsement, it could have released the collateral
·•1th impunity.
ld.

at

4 10

.

That a contractual waiver covering a "release" of
collateral includes a failure to perfect a security interest in that
was also made clear in the recent case of Executive Bank
cf Fort Lauderdale v.

-fol J

Tighe, 429 N.E. 2d 1054, 32 UCC Rep. 894 (N.Y.

In Tighe, the lower court distinguished a "release" from a

•

'11lure to file on grounds that the former is "a deliberate act at a
··'He

time whereas the latter is a negligent act which occurs at

threshold of the transaction."
'' iowed

The New York Court of Appeals

Etelson in rejecting this distinction:

From a guarantor's point of view, it makes no difference when or
with whdt intent, short of bad faith, the collateral is reduced
-9-

or reledsed. From his ?Oint of view, t'1e effect (i'1crease
potential liaoility through the decrease of his source of
reimbursement) is exactly the same.
420 N.E.2d at 1058.
In Reeves v.
App.

Hunnicutt,

6 ucc Rep.

168 S.E.2d 663,

1969), a debtor claimed that his obligations under a prom 1 s,·

note were discharged because the secured creditor failed to
a security interest in the
argument,

The court rejected this

because the note contained a provision that the "sJrrec..

or release" of any collateral by the secured creditors would not
affect the debtor's liability.

168 S.E.2d at 664.

Hunnicutt

is

particularly apposite to this case, because its provision
to the "surrender or release" of collateral is virtually identico.
to the provision here,

which speaks of "release or surrender" of

collateral.
The holdings of Etelson and Hunnicutt have been acceptec
every court which has dealt with this issue.

Indeed, at least '.•·

appellate courts have relied on Etelson to affirm motions for
summary judgment against guarantors who consented to a "release"
"surrender" of collateral yet claimed unjustified impairment by
virtue of the secured party's failure to perfect.
of Upson,

201 S.E.2d 463,

13 UCC Rep.

1102 (Ga.

In Greene v.

1973), the guac;·

agreement permitted the secured [)arty to "without notice, surrec
. all or any r:>art of the collateral."

201

s. E.

22 ac 464 .

Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's granting of
judgment, as "under the agreements here,

the atir:>ellant consente:

the impairment of the collateral and can not now complain".
Similarly,

in Haney v.

Deposit

National BanK,
- 10 -

c.

D

362 so."

_5 UCC 206,
on

, t'1g

(Miss. 1978), the Mississippi Supreme Court,
and

affirmed summary judgment against a

-

whose payment agreement provided that "the Bank may at its

•

surrender any collateral without affecting the liability

:C dny obligor";

the court held that failure to perfect the security

."terest was one method of surrendering the collateral, which the
Jtantor had agreed would not extinguish her obligation.

362 So. 2d

12 s 2.

Etelson was also followed in American Bank of Commerce v.
540 P. 2d 1294, 17 UCC Rep. 1052 (Noe'!. 1975), the case relied
hy the court below.

Under the

guaranty agreement, the

•nder bank had the right to "waive and release" the security at any
without affecting the guarantor's obligation to pay .
_:93.

.!£· at

The court held that by agreeing to such express language, the

:"arantor could not claim that his liability was extinguished by the
·,onK's

failure to perfect a security interest:

a guarantor or surety expressly and unequivocally consents
to a waiver or release of his rights in the collateral, he will
not be heard to complain of the failure of the guarantee to
perfect its security therein in the first instance.

ii-

at 1299.
is especially relevant to this case because the

.• rantor there argued, as do Appellants here, that the secured
owes the guarantor a duty to perfect his security interest
oclateral, and failure to do so discharges the guarantor, even
-. consented to the failure to perfect.
Jnlor in

To this effect, both the

and Appellants here cited St. Paul Fire and

-,. I:isurance co. v. New Jersey Bank and Trust, 250 A.2d 57 (N.J.
-11-

Sup. 1969),
( 1971) .

rev'd on other grounds,

137 N.J.

Super.

294' 349

Covolo rejected this argument as applying solel; to

suretyships at common law,

540 P.2d at 1296,

fn.

2,

thus

establishing that the enactment of UCC § 3-606 modifies the
law of suretyships by allowing guarantors to waive then ri•i"::
the collateral.
Appellants argue that

is distinguishable fcom.,

present case by claiming that a contractual provision for the
of guarantor's rights in the security was present
absent here.

·•a
y•:

This contention is wholly without merit.

guaranty dgreement provided that the lender may "waive and rele,:the security without affecting the guarantor's liability, whLle :·present contract speaks of "release or surrender" of the secur1> 1·
Even assuming that a "surrender" of collateral is not
a "waiver" of it, so that Covolo would not precisely cover this
situation, Hunnicutt,

and Haney can be cited for the

proposition that a guarantor who gives the secured party a righ:
"surrender" the collateral has consented to any failure to perfec·
and cannot claim that such a failure extinguishes his liability.
Appellants also attempt to distinguish
only to situations i:1 which the documents "specified on theic f3:•
that they were to be unsecured.

This argument is misleading.

A

section of the Covolo opinion did deal with a promissory note
on its face specified that it was to be unsecured but the sec:.·
which Respondent and the lower court here rely discussed
promissory note which did !l.21 state on its face that it was to··
unsecured.

540 P.2d at 1298-99.
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.;pp<e Llants would also distinguish
"

from the present

that her<e extrinsic evidence -- mainly in the form of the
,'lceernent and the course of dealing between Utah Security
','J 0

,

f '1C.

and Respondent

is available to prove that the

'..es intended Respondent be liable for failure to perfect its
,-.:.Hit/

interest in that the collateral, notwithstanding the

.,pi1c1t provision to the contrary in the guaranty agreement.

c

Even

evidence would so indicate, Utah law makes the evidence

.",;atidoiP here, because the guaranty agreement -- the source of
ool1gations between Appellants and Respondent -- is clear and

·.a

·,ambtgJous on this point.
This Court has repeatedly stressed that extrinsic evidence
·"available only if the instrument embodying the contract and
JC'.igations between the parties is ambiguous,

v.

=,:st Colonv Life Insurance Co., 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979), and
cJrol evidence, such as evidence relating to the course of dealing,
:ac be

orily as a last resort in the event that both the

.cstrurnent und contemporaneous writings are ambiguous, Continental
3e.c,: and Trust v. Bybee, 306 P.2d 773, 775 (Utah 1957).

Here, under

and its progeny -- all of which decided the issue by looking
iol l1 to the respective writings, and not to extrinsic evidence
0

· 11strurnent clearly provides that Appellants are not relieved of
,c1lity by Respondent's failure to perfect a security interest, so
.,•, law, as expressed in Williams and Bybee, requires that
•Ste evidence not be considered here.
It is also argued in Appellant's Brief

is

1J,:shable from the present case because Respondents acted in
-13-

--with a

lack of

"good faith" dnd "honest:; in fact"

loan to Utah Security Mortgage,

Respondent induced Utah Security Mortgaqe,
unsecured

loan agreement,

believed it had obtain a
Appellants at p.
for

18.

this contention,

T'."\c.

"-"agree

t'>

j

knowi'.1g that U::ah Secur it:;
loan unles3

it was secured.

Even assuming that there

Brief Qf

is a

it cdnnot lie f'.Jr procedural reasons.

allegation of bad faith
allegation of

l:t

Inc.

is merely a rewording of Appellants'

T'

fraud that was made before the District Court.

allegation was disregarded by the court ::ielow· because it was •.,.:for

the firsc

time on oral argument before the District Court.

Continental Bank and Trust Co. v.
Civil No. C8l-3l62

Utah Security Mortgage,

(Third District Court,

December 11, c98;

The lower court's decision on this issue should be affirmed.
is an affirmative defense under: Rule 8(c)
Procedure,

for: summary judgment or
Vogel,

in its dnswer

134 F.2d 908, 912

Pr:actice,

p.

56-736.

(2nd Cir.

the trial court

its affidavits on tc1e
to the complai:-it.

Ross

l t':'.

1943), 6 :-toore's Federal

this Court applies the same staoclad 0

in determining the existence of mater ia'- issJe:

Durham v. Margetts,

571 P.2d 1332,

Court should disregard Appellants'
refuse to

it must be ['lead;:

Since upon review of a lower court decis

granting summar1 judgment,

fact,

of the Utah Rules of:_

so like other affirmative defenses,

the part] opposi:-ig summary judgment in

F:i

1334

i'Jtah 1977), roi-

allegations Gf

o:-i this poi:-it.

- l 4-

"ba-i fa1t: 1 " "

The Gc1arant1 Agreement Exoressl1 Provided that Respondent
Duty to Sell the Stock Before it Deoreciated.
Apoecl3nts also allege that Respondent's failure to sell
.1oc• of Bonneville Thrift when the stock was worth enough to

c,,,,, amoc1:-it of the loan constit-.ited an impairment of the
.ateral wh1ch relieves them of their obligations under UCC
Code A:-inotated

-6J6,

§

70A-3-606.

Again, even assuming

basis for these allegations, Appellants have no

1s a

_.,/ to complain, because they consented to any such failure by
that their liability would not be affected by "release" of
'"-: co

r a l. .

.1.

As discussed aoove, courts have constrc1ed such a provision
coC"lsent oy the guarantor to

action or omission on the part

secured creditor which reduces the value of the collateral or
In Tighe, suora, the court held that a
·1s1on consenting to a "release" of the collateral operates a
·- ""t to a:-iy act or omission that increases the guarantor's
'cJ'.<?C)ttal liability through the decrease of his source of
TO•csement", 429 N.E.2d at 1058.
This principle was illustrated in De Kalb County Bank v.
:'46 S.E.2d 116, 24 TJCC Rep. 716 (Ga. App. 1978).

I n

!!.s.1fil ,

failed to procure credit life insurance on the life of
·0ccowar, as required by the loan and guaranty agreements. The

tnat eve:-i thoc1gh the creditor's omission did amount to an
·rneGt oE the collateral, the guarantor could not claim
J':;'.,
1·1.,;d

oecac1se he "expressly consented to such impairment when
the guara:-ity agreement," 246 S.E.2d at 117.
-15-

--Tighe and

clearly establish that a guarantor who

consents to a release of collateral consents to any omission ,
secured party which results in d loss of the collateral's value
Since Appelldnts consented to any such omission,

they cannot no·•

complain of Respondent's alleged failure to sell the Bonneville
Thrift shares when they had some value.
C.

Appellants Could Have Prevented Any Alleged Depreciat 10 •
the Value of the Shares.
Appellants' claim that they were injured by Respondent's

failure to sell the shares of Bonneville Thrift pledged as
collateral at a time when they allegedly had value is further
undermined by the fact that Appellants could have obtained the
shares

such time and sold them.

Under the doctrine of

subrogation, Appellants, as guarantors of Utah Security Mortgage':
obligation to Respondent, would have become entitled to the shar

0

:

upon payment in full of the amounts due on the promissory notes,
See Restatement of Restitution,
Subrogation §

53

(1974).

§

76 (1954); 73 Am.Jur.2d

Upon obtaining possession of the shares,

Appellants could have then sold the shares by themselves, thereby
eliminating any alleged harm to them which resulted from Resronrie·
not selling the shares.
II.

RESPONDENT OBSERVED STANDARDS OF REASONABLE CARE AS ESTABLIS'
IN THE GUARANTY AGREEMENT.
Appellants, by permitting Respondent to "reledse or

surrender" the collateral, not only consented to Respondent's
conduct, but also agreed to modify the standard of reasondble

cCi

in preserving the collateral that Respondent was required to ob·
under UCC § 9-207, U.C.A.

§

70A-9-207.
-16-

Section 9-207(1) provides:
A secured party must use reasonable care in the
ustody and preservation of collateral in his possession.
In
the case of an instrument or chattel paper reasonable care
taking necessary steps to preserve rights against prior
parties unless otherwise agreed.
·ornment l to § 9-207 states that under § 1-102 ( 3)

the parties to a

secJrity agreement may determine what constitutes "reasonable care"

:o' tne purposes of their agreement, so long as the standards set
a:e not "manifestly unreasonable".
Courts have given the parties to a guaranty agreement broad
to determine the applicable standard of care under § 9-207.
;c Jnion Planters National Bank v. Markowitz, 468 F. Supp. 529 (W.D.
:'ecn. 1979)

the guaranty agreement provided:

. . In order to hold the undersigned liable hereunder, there
shall be no obligation on the part of [the secured creditor] at
anytime to first resort to, make demand on, file claim against,
or exhaust its remedies against the Debtor, anyone or more of
the undersigned, . . . or to resort to and exhaust its remedies
against any collateral (orl security
;08 F.Supp. at 533

(emphasis supplied).

The court held that this

Jrovision set a standard of reasonable care, that freed the secured
:reditor from any duty to perfect a security interest in the
-olldteral,

and that the prov is ion was valid under § 9-207 (1):

The first sentence of [ § 9-207 ( 1) J essentially requires a
secured party to use reasonable care not to destroy or injure
coUateral in his possession . . . The second sentence of
9-207 (1)] adds the element that the duty of reasonable care
cequires that the secured party take steps to preserve his
· .yhts in that collateral unless otherwise agreed.
We interpret
li•ts to mean that the duty of reasonable care does not require a
oecured party to preserve its rights in collateral when the
agree otherwise.
Here, the guaranty agreement clearly
states that [the secured party] need not take steps to protect
'H3 rights in the collateral.
Thus, [his] obligation of
ed.sonable care under [§ 9-207] was satisfied.
Supp. at 534

(emphasis in original).

-17-

Many of the cases the hold that a fadure to perfect

3

security interest in collateral constituted a "release"
by contract also contain an alternative holding that the contrac·
provision established a standard of performance, disclaiming an;
obligation to per feet on the part of the secured creditor, that ,,
valid under§ 9-207(1).
410.

In Covolo,

supra,

Etelson, supra,

283 A.2d at

the court held that the agreement, by g11 _.

the secured creditor the right to "waive and release" the
collateral, established a standard of reas0nable care that was
"manifestly unreasonable," so the agreement was valid under
§ 9-207(1)

as a determination of the standard of care of the

collateral to which the secured party would be held.
Covolo court concluded,

Therefore,

the guarantor could not claim discharge

under § 9-207 because the secured party failed to perfect a secur.·
interest.

540 P.2d at 1298.
Applying these precedents to the instant case,

it must Je

concluded that Respondent had no duty to perfect a security inte,;:
in the trust deeds, since the guaranty agreement validly disclaime.
such a duty by allowing Respondent to "release or surrender" the
co 1 lateral.

Furthermore, because Etelson and

valid consent for

the purposes of § 3-606 (1) (b)

indicate tr.a·
also constitJte 0

modification of the "reasonable care" standard of§ 9-207(11,
"release or surrender" provision also operates to modify the
standard of care applicable to the Bonneville Thrift stock.
the "release or surrender" provision constituted consent to th•
alleged failure to make a proper sale of the stock -- for reasc":
discussed above

it also establishes the standard of care

- ls-

1

,

1caule to the stock, under which Respondents had no duty to sell
stock before it became worthless.
RES POND ENT HAD NO DUTY TO PURSUE ANY OTHER SECURITY BEFORE
dRINGING THIS ACTION AGAINST APPELLANTS.

,! [

A.

Recent Opinions of This Court Have Expressly Rejected the
Existence of Such a Duty.
This Court has repeatedly held in recent cases that a

secJred creditor whose security consists solely of personal property
,,as no duty to proceed against

the collateral before bringing an

,,:tion against sureties or absolute guarantors.
Jf :::ohraim,

594 P. 2d 881

In Kennedy v. Bank

(Utah 1979), a secured creditor brought an

i::1on against the surety and other parties liable on a promissory

co:e.

The parties claimed that they should not be held personally

.table, because the secured creditor is required to satisfy its debt
from the collateral before proceeding against

the surety and the

Jther

parties.

The court rejected this argument for situations in

,1n1ch

the collateral is personal property by looking to § 9-501 of

tne Uniform Commercial Code,

Utah Code Annotated

S 70A-9-501, which

orov ides:

When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a
secured party
. may reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose
or otherwise enforce the security interest by any available
Judicial procedure.
'!.y1ng upon Michigan National Bank v. Marston, 185 N.W.2d 47, B UCC
l 17)
,Jee rlS

1:'1ich. App. 1970), this Court read the Uniform Commercial

allowing the secured party a broad choice of remedies.
Marston,

fhe

this Court added:

existence of a security interest in no way affects the
of the debt.
It merely provides the secured party

-19-

with dn immediate source of recovery in addition to the st,·
remedies of an unsecured creditor.

594 P.2d at 884.
This Court then concluded in Kennedy:
We hold that the [secured creditor] has an option to pursue
of the parties liable on this '1ote, which is 5ecured solel;
personal property, and may also, at its option, ignore that
and sati5fy its judgment from other property in the
nands of the Judgment debtor.

1£.

Since the collateral here is in the form of persondl proper·

Respondent had no duty to proceed agaipst the collateral before
bringing this action against Appellants as sureties.
The strong policy i'1 favor of giving secured parties a
broad choice of remedies in case of default was reiterated by t:..
Court in Strevell-Paterson Co. v.
19 82) .

Francis,

646 P.2d 741

(Utah

In that case, the guarantor signed an absolute guaranty

a loan to the corporation of which he was a director;
the guaranty,

in additio:

the corporation granted the creditor a security

interest in the corporation's inventory and accounts receivable.
When the corporate borrower defaulted,
a default judgment against it.
judgment,

the secured creditor obta.

Instead of collecting on that

the secured creditor brought a separate action against

guarantor, who argued that the secured creditor must first
its remedies against the debtor and the coLlaterdl before
an action against the guarantor.

This Court rejected the

guarantor's argument because he was liable under an absolute
guaranty:
The guarantee at issue i:-1 this appeal i3 a:-1 absolute
of payment .
It contai:-is :-10 exoress or implie<l con<litio·
liability and no contractual
that the creditor
satisfaction elsewhere before commencing action on the
-20-

The fact that the creditor obtained a judgment
•111nst the debtor but failed to allege execution on that
J.dgment or exhaustion of his remedies against the debtor or the
does not alter the nature of the guarantor's
tn0ependent obligation as a guarantor.

i..!.·

3t

743-44.

In so holding, this Court upheld the lower court's

1rant of summary judgment against the guarantors.

Since Appellants

concede that the guaranty in this case is an absolute guaranty
Brief, at p. 11), under Strevell-Paterson they cannot
this action by claiming that Respondents have failed to
nroceed ctgainst the collateral.
Appellants' position in this case is even weaker than the
cOStt1ons of the guarantors in Kennedy and Strevell-Paterson.

In

:11s case, the guaranty agreement contains express language
Jrov1d1ng that the liability of the guarantor would not be affected
-!

tne release or surrender of any security, while the guaranty

o?reements in Kennedy and Strevell-Paterson contained no such
.01·;udge.
.1

Thus, there is an even stronger basis here than here was

Kennedv and Strevell-Paterson for holding that Respondent had no

j_t/

to proceed against the collateral before commencing this action

>Ja1nst Appellants.
B.

Doctrine of Election of Remedies Inapplicable.
Appellants seek to distinguish Strevell-Paterson and
from the present case in that here Respondent had a choice

:

remedies -- proceeding against the collateral or proceeding

,,_nst Appellants as guarantors -- and exercised the former choice
giving notice of an election to sell the Bonneville
--.:.ft shares.

it

Appellants ussert that since Respondent made this

is barred from exercising the other alternative --21-

proceeding against Appellants -- by the doctrine of election of
remedies.
argument,

Assuming arguendo that there is a factual basis for'.
it is inapplicable here for both procedural and

substantive reasons.
This Court should disregard Appellants' argument on thi:
issue because it was not presented to the court below.

This

will not consider on appeal a legal theory not presented to the
lower court, Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267,

2n

(Utah 1982). Appellants did not raise the issue of election oE
remedies before the District Court, either in their memorandum h
support of their motion for summary judgment, or in their
in opposition to respondent'

motion for summary judgment, so the

issue is not properly before this Court and should be disregarded.
Even if the issue of election of remedies were properly
raised,

it would still be inapplicable to this case, as the

transactions here are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.
Section 9-501(1) of the Code, Utah Code Annotated§ 70A-9-50l(l),
provides:

When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a
secured party has the rights and remedies provided in this Pa'.
and . . . those provided in the security agreement.
He may
reduce his claim to judgment, foreclose or otherwise enforce
security interest by any available judicial procedure . . · T
rights and remedies referred to in this subsection are
cumulative.
All courts that have construed this provision have held that by

expressly making cumulative the remedies of the secured party upo
default,
remedies.

it eliminates the common law doctrine of election of
69 Am.Jur.2d § 557,

P.

446,

Utah adopted this position in Kennedy v.
- 22-

and cases cited there:·

Ban'< of Eohra im,

_onnedy, this Court relied heavily on Michigan Nationdl Bank v.
185 N.W.2d 47, 8 UCC Rep.
,:.0

:0

1375

(Mich. App. 1970), which, as

ned,L noted, found that the intent of the Code is to "broaden the

ooc1ons open to a creditor after default rather than to limit them
l[

Jnder the old theory of election of remedies".

594 P.2d at 884.

The inapplicability of the doctrine of election of remedies

l[

cases

governed by the Uniform Commercial Code was stressed in

Fertilizer, Inc. v. Beekman, 308 N.W.2d 347, 31 UCC Rep. 1489
•,Neb.

1981).

In Beekman, a secured creditor brought an action

agd1nst a debtor who hdd defaulted on a promissory note and obtained
dga inst the debtor.

a

The judgment was later vacated, and

cne lower court held that the secured party could not maintain a
i.

separate action under the security agreement because he had elected
to proceed against the debtor,

and under the doctrine of election of

:emed1es, his rights accrued solely from the judgment.
S1preme Court reversed, holding that under

§

The Nebraska

9-501(1), a secured

:reditor by pursuing one remedy, is not precluded from asserting his
rights under another remedy.

308 N.W.

2d at 349.

In dCcord with Beekman is Ruidoso State Bank v. Garcia, 587
P.2d 435

(N.M. 1978), a case involving facts very similar to those

-" Beekman.

In construing

§

9-501(1),

the Ruidoso court stated:

There is nothing ambiguous about this statutory provision.
It
plainly states that all the remedies of proceeding on the note
dnd the security agreement are cumulative.
Each of them remains
1n force although efforts have been made to collect the debt by
the alternate means.
P.2d at 437.
Beekman and Ruidoso establish that even if Appellants could
dS

a matter of fact that Respondent attempted to sell the
-23-

Bonneville Thrift stock, it is not barred from utilizing the
alternative remedy of proceeding against Appellants as guarantor
Thus, Appellants' allegation that Respondent attempted to disp 08 ,
the stock presents no issue of fact that is material to the outcs·
of this case.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the District Court granting summary
judgment in favor of Respondent should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

of July,

1983.

FABIAN & CLENDENIN,
A Professional Corporation

By

T"' .,

;\ -------

Albert J. Colton

By __
Ran d a 11 A. Mackey
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this

of July, 1983, I

.;aused to be mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing
8r 1 ef of Respondent, postage prepaid,

to James R. Brown, Esq.,

Jdrdine, Linebdugh, Brown & Dunn, 370 East South Temple, Salt Lake
city, Utah 84111;
LdKe

to Ron S. Barker, 2870 South State Street, Salt

city, Utah 84115; and to Adrienne Badger, prose, 694 East 1900

sooth, Bountiful, Utah 84010.
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